Indian federalism has accommodated diversity through linguistic states, asymmetric arrangements for Jammu and Kashmir, the North-East and union territories, the Sixth Schedule and special provisions. Asymmetric federalism gives differentiated autonomy and protections, but it can also create inequality and centre-state friction. Dispute-resolution mechanisms need strengthening through inter-state councils, river-water tribunals, finance commission reform, cooperative federalism institutions and timely judicial resolution.
Functions and Responsibilities of the Union and the States, Issues and Challenges Pertaining to the Federal Structure, Devolution of Powers and Finances up to Local Levels and Challenges Therein — UPSC PYQs & Notes
Every previous year question on Functions and Responsibilities of the Union and the States, Issues and Challenges Pertaining to the Federal Structure, Devolution of Powers and Finances up to Local Levels and Challenges Therein from Indian Polity & Governance, with answers and explanations.
Every PYQ on this topic
Attempt each question first, then reveal the answer and explanation.
Source: questions are reproduced from UPSC Civil Services papers; answers and explanations are written by upscnest and are not official UPSC keys — see the disclaimer.
Centre-state financial relations evolved from a Planning Commission-driven model to a Finance Commission-led transfer system after the abolition of the Planning Commission and the introduction of GST. Recent reforms, including GST, increased devolution and cess/surcharge centralisation, have changed fiscal federalism. The answer should examine vertical and horizontal imbalances, the declining role of states in tax decisions, and recommend a stronger Finance Commission, predictable transfers and cooperative fiscal institutions.
Recent Union initiatives include the GST Council, increased Finance Commission devolution, NITI Aayog, aspirational districts, centrally sponsored schemes, the use of cess and surcharge, the Governor's discretionary role, and disputes over Delhi's services and CBI consent. These have centralised fiscal and administrative power even as formal devolution has risen. To rebuild trust, the answer should suggest strengthening the Inter-State Council, respecting the GST Council's federal spirit, avoiding partisan use of institutions, timely disaster and scheme funds, and cooperative mechanisms for river and border disputes. Conclude that federalism is a partnership, not a hierarchy.
Local bodies promote good governance through proximity, participation, accountability and context-specific service delivery, as envisaged by the 73rd and 74th Amendments. Merging rural and urban local bodies has advantages: integrated planning for peri-urban sprawl, economies of scale, reduced fragmentation and better waste and transport management. But it also has costs: different capacities and revenue bases, dilution of rural voice, loss of constitutional distinctness and weaker accountability. The answer should conclude that convergence, shared service platforms and metropolitan planning committees are preferable to a blanket merger.
The 101st Constitutional Amendment introduced the Goods and Services Tax, creating a unified national market through a GST Council with representation from the Centre and states. It reflects cooperative federalism because decisions require consensus, states retain autonomy over rates within the framework and compensation was promised. It also shows accommodative flexibility through the concept of a destination-based tax and the Council's dispute-resolution role. Critics note the Centre's weighted voting and the erosion of state fiscal autonomy. Conclude that the amendment institutionalises shared sovereignty, though its working must preserve genuine state voice.
The answer should recall that Article 356 was used frequently before the mid-1990s, often for partisan purposes. Its reduced use followed the S.R. Bommai judgment, which subjected presidential rule to judicial review and insisted on a floor test; the decline of single-party dominance and the rise of coalition politics; the formation of the Inter-State Council and better centre-state consultation; and greater media and judicial scrutiny. The answer should note that the article has not disappeared and can still be misused. Conclude that legal doctrine and political pluralism together restrained its use.
The answer should explain that states are reluctant to devolve functions and funds to urban local bodies because of political control, bureaucratic resistance, weak municipal finance and the fear of losing patronage. Despite the 74th Amendment and the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules, many states have not transferred subjects, and urban bodies depend on grants and limited taxes. Measures include empowering municipal bonds, property tax reform, direct transfers, cadre autonomy, metropolitan planning committees and capacity building. Conclude that genuine urban federalism requires both constitutional intent and political will.
The statement reflects a broad tendency rather than an absolute rule. National parties often favour centralisation because they seek uniformity, fiscal control and national narratives, while regional parties demand autonomy to protect local identity, resources and power. But national parties also decentralise when politically expedient, and regional parties may centralise within their states. The answer should cite examples such as GST, Article 356, language policy and federal negotiations. Conclude that party structure and electoral incentives, not principle alone, shape positions on centralisation.
Decentralisation has changed grassroots governance through elected panchayats and municipalities, reservations for women and marginalised groups, participatory planning, Gram Sabha roles and devolved functions. It has improved local accountability, service delivery and political representation. Yet elite capture, weak fiscal autonomy, parallel bodies, bureaucratic resistance and inadequate capacity limit its impact. The answer should give examples such as Kerala's people's planning and women's leadership in panchayats. Conclude that decentralisation has transformed the landscape unevenly and needs genuine funds, functions and functionaries.
The CBI derives jurisdiction from the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act and requires state consent to investigate within a state, though the Supreme Court and High Courts can order investigations and the Centre can use its powers in specific cases. The consent is not absolute because constitutional courts can intervene, and the CBI can investigate central government employees and inter-state crimes. The answer should explain federal concerns about misuse and the need for balanced cooperation. Conclude that the CBI must be professional and accountable, while states should not obstruct genuine investigations.
The 14th Finance Commission raised the states' share of central taxes from 32 to 42 percent, increased untied transfers and reduced the number of centrally sponsored schemes, giving states greater fiscal autonomy. It also introduced performance incentives and supported local bodies through grants. These measures improved states' fiscal space and predictability, though some states remained dependent on central transfers and the abolition of the Planning Commission changed the architecture. The answer should note the accompanying decline in discretionary grants. Conclude that the Commission strengthened cooperative fiscal federalism.
The answer should trace the shift from the formative 'three Fs' of functions, functionaries and funds to the contemporary challenge of functionality. Despite the 73rd and 74th Amendments, many local bodies lack genuine devolution, untied funds and trained staff, and face parallel bodies and bureaucratic resistance. Functionality challenges include elite capture, weak capacity, poor fiscal autonomy, irregular elections, inadequate gram sabha participation and top-down schemes. Examples include uneven implementation of the 12th and 11th Schedules. Conclude that strengthening local democracy requires genuine devolution, capacity building and accountability.
Cooperation, competition and confrontation together shape Indian federalism. Cooperation appears in the GST Council, Finance Commission transfers and inter-state councils. Competition appears in welfare models, investment attraction and claims to resources and taxes. Confrontation appears in disputes over Article 356, CBI consent, river waters, GST compensation and the farm laws. Recent examples include the GST compensation debate and centre-state friction during COVID-19. The answer should note that cooperative mechanisms are strong but political competition often turns into confrontation. Conclude that institutionalised dialogue can convert confrontation into productive competition.
The answer should partly agree. Reservation of seats for women in local bodies has increased women's political participation, representation and leadership, and brought attention to women's issues, as seen in many panchayats. Yet its impact on the patriarchal character of politics is limited by proxy representation (sarpanch patis), tokenism, rotation of seats, lack of real power and funds, caste and class barriers, and resistance from male-dominated structures. The answer should recommend genuine devolution, capacity building and reserved seats in higher legislatures. Conclude that reservation is necessary but not sufficient without deeper social and institutional change.
The Panchayat system is important as the constitutionalised third tier of local government under the 73rd Amendment, bringing democracy to the grassroots, ensuring participatory planning, implementing development schemes, delivering basic services, promoting social justice and empowering women and marginalised groups through reservation. Beyond government grants and Finance Commission devolution, panchayats can raise finances through own-source revenue such as property and profession taxes, user charges for water and sanitation, fees and licences, rents from markets and land, cesses, public-private partnerships, corporate social responsibility funds, community contributions, minor forest produce, and borrowing with approval. Conclude that genuine fiscal autonomy and own revenues are essential for panchayats to be effective and self-reliant.
The answer should critically examine the statement. Local self-government has been strengthened by the 73rd and 74th Amendments, with regular elections, reservations for women and marginalised groups, and constitutional status, and it has improved grassroots participation and service delivery in many states, as in Kerala. Yet it has often not proved effective because of incomplete devolution of funds, functions and functionaries, parallel bodies, bureaucratic resistance, elite capture, weak fiscal autonomy, capacity gaps and irregular elections. To improve, measures include genuine devolution, untied funds, capacity building, social audits, strengthening gram sabhas and district planning. Conclude that local self-government is promising but needs real empowerment to become an effective instrument of governance.
The 13th Finance Commission, for the period 2010-15, was a departure from previous commissions in strengthening local government finances. It increased the share of local bodies in the divisible pool by recommending a grant of about Rs 87,519 crore to panchayats and municipalities, and linked part of the grant to performance. It introduced a performance-based grant system rewarding states that devolved funds, functions and functionaries to local bodies, improved their accounting and audit systems, and made them disclose basic details. It recommended setting up an independent local body ombudsman, prescribed conditions for availing grants, and emphasised the need for a robust local body finance database and timely elections. The answer should note that these measures sought to make local governments financially self-reliant and accountable. Conclude that the 13th Finance Commission meaningfully strengthened local government finances through larger, conditional and performance-linked grants.
The constitutional mechanisms to resolve inter-state water disputes, mainly Article 262 and the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, with tribunals such as those for the Cauvery, Krishna, Godavari and Ravi-Beas, have largely failed to solve problems. The failure is due to both structural and process inadequacies. Structural: the law does not provide a clear, time-bound and final mechanism, the Centre can delay or refuse to constitute or notify tribunals, and there is no effective enforcement, while states are reluctant to cede authority. Process: tribunals take decades, are prolonged by litigation and appeals, lack a dispute resolution and data-sharing framework, are hampered by weak basin-level planning and outdated data, and are politicised. The answer should suggest a single, permanent, time-bound national tribunal and river-basin authorities. Conclude that both structural and process deficiencies have caused the failure, requiring comprehensive legal and institutional reform.
The question asks whether more and smaller states would bring effective governance at the state level, just as districts and talukas are bifurcated for better administration. Arguments for smaller states: they bring administration closer to the people, improve accountability and responsiveness, allow focus on local needs, reduce regional imbalance and marginalisation, and can improve service delivery and development, as seen in the creation of Uttarakhand, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. Arguments against: smaller states may not be economically viable, may increase administrative and political costs, create new regional and resource disputes, weaken the larger state, and do not automatically guarantee good governance, which depends more on institutions, leadership and capacity. The answer should note that governance improves with decentralisation and capability, not size alone. Conclude that smaller states can help but are not a sufficient condition for effective governance.
Article 371A of the Constitution gives special protection to Nagaland, providing that no Act of Parliament shall apply to the state in respect of Naga religious or social practices, Naga customary law and procedure, administration of civil and criminal justice according to Naga customary law, and ownership and transfer of land and its resources, unless the Nagaland Legislative Assembly so decides. Recent directives from the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas regarding oil and gas exploration were perceived by the Nagas as a threat to this exceptional status, because they feared that central regulation would override their control over land and mineral resources. The issue highlights tensions between central resource policy and constitutional safeguards. Conclude that any central directive touching land and resources in Nagaland must respect Article 371A and the consent of the state legislature, and be implemented through consultation with the Naga people.
Notes on this topic
Short, syllabus-aligned notes for a final pass before the exam.
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